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Download as many books as you like Personal use 3. Cancel the membership at any time if not satisfied. Lisa Doran I was suspicious at first when I got redirected to the membership site. Markus Jensen I did not think that this would work, my best friend showed me this website, and it does! Hun Tsu My friends are so mad that they do not know how I have all the high quality ebook which they do not! He was also headmaster of both these schools. While with the Public Debt Administration, he submitted a memorandum layiha to the sultan on changes he perceived as necessary in the running of the state.
No, I say again, I was a true and compassionate friend of writers. If I had been their enemy, I had the men to strike authors and writers down in the middle of the street. But, although such direct state control may have been lifted, the inherent bond between historian and state remained. Political pressure continued to be exerted. As early as , the organic relation between state and intellectual within the Ottoman context was underlined by Muhittin Birgen. In this history, the nation was inconsequential, this history was thus not the history of the nation, but of something alien.
These intellectuals had a socialist outlook and had relations with the Soviet Union, many having been educated there.
Our yearning and inclination are only for the new. As a result of such attacks, reforms began in The historian became a servant of the state which gave him a duty. The historian now had a more institutionalized role within the state machinery than he had had before. The new republic sought to raise its own state historians in order to cultivate the idea of history defined according to the needs of the state. One important part of dissemination was the writing of popular history. Similar themes, for example the glorification of the Ottoman past which carried a religious overtone, were integrated into literary works such as poems and short stories, especially those published in journals and newspapers.
This differentiation between academic and popular history books further developed during the Republican era. Upon his request copies of his book were bought for the Halkevleri libraries. The high school or university texts of the late Ottoman and early Republican era, in fact, were mostly based on the lecture notes of the professors, which were either compiled by the professors themselves or from notes taken by their students. School text books played an important part in the shaping of identity by inculcating the school children with patriotic feelings and loyalty to the fatherland, and training them to be good citizens.
Work with all your mind to preserve this honour. You can only prove your love of the millet and loyalty to the fatherland in this way. Only history can teach you these lessons. That is why you must, lovingly and thoughtfully, read Ottoman history which teaches you the conditions of your fatherland and the greatness of your millet.
We too have a history. And a very glorious one. Its name is the history of the Anatolian Turks. Everyone must absolutely know the history of their own nation. If we do not know our history, we can have no national feeling. Such people who have no feeling for nation, no feeling of nationalism are no use to you, me or anybody else. The Balkans are nothing more than a belt of large dumplings, so to speak, which permit infantry to wind around them in all directions, making roads as they go for artillery and transport trains.
Looking very much from within the region, her concern is to find out why the term came to have such pejorative connotations. It does not mean the Balkan states alone. While Todorova assigns to it a neutral and non-pejorative meaning, again, as in English, the term may or may not carry a pejorative connotation. In the dictionaries of the period, the term balkan means mountain or chain of mountains or mountainous, thus not necessarily being a regional geographical definition.
In fact the term Rumeli can be seen as an Ottoman-centric term whereas the Balkan Peninsula is very much a Euro-centric term. Even though the terms may on occasion overlap in the geographical area they cover, they reflect different political outlooks. The Province of Rumeli: The province included the following places: The Balkans were depicted as including the Ottoman European territories of Eastern Rumeli, Macedonia, Kosova, autonomous Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovinia, which was de facto under the occupation of Austria-Hungary, together with the independent states of the region: Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro.
Thus, the Ottoman territories were alienated from the Ottoman empire itself and, at least at the level of discourse, gained a distinct identity through becoming a part of a non-Ottoman whole, that is the Balkans. Various possible explanations can be put forward for this lack of Ottoman internalisation of this term. While there are some documents giving general outlines of censorship based on previous experiences, the necessity of the day, and the personal perceptions of those who wrote the reports on censorship,36 there is apparently no government-issued list of the words that were censored in this era.
This flexibility of censorship does not, therefore, permit any clear-cut conclusions to be made over what was or was not banned throughout the period. The Ottoman provinces of Albania and Armenia, as well as Bulgaria and Eastern Rumeli, were represented in The Times, a newspaper often referred to, and taken seriously, by the Ottomans themselves, as independent of Turkey, while Kurdistan, another Ottoman province, was considered within Turkey.
What was of great significance in the European vision of the region was the religious denomination of the population of the area and European perception tended to be framed in religious terms. Europe thus interested itself in Armenia for example, while Kurdistan was apparently seen as lying outside any central European concern in what might be linked to a general perception of the Ottoman empire as an Islamic empire while the heavily Christian populated provinces within the empire were seen as something separate, almost as something not naturally part of the Ottoman world.
In fact, European states had traditionally used Christianity as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state, the French supporting the Catholics, the British the Protestants and the Russians the Orthodox population. This argument, however, must remain speculative.
Indeed, any argument of conscious rejection of the use of this Eurocentric term in general is not easy to prove due to lack of any documentary evidence, and is further undermined by the increase in the usage of the Balkans in its Euro-centric meaning in the post period. Instead Ali Haydar Midhat referred to Rumeli: However, although the term itself appeared more and more in the texts of the era, the meaning s attributed to the term was not always clear or consistent. The new Turkish Republic inherited both the concept of the Balkans and its fluidity from the late Ottoman era.
According to this map, the Balkans as a region is defined according to the Balkan states, the Balkans thus being a political designation rather than a geographical one. As Albania was not to be involved in the agreement, Turkey did not wish to use the term Balkan. However, like the European usage, the Ottoman-Turkish usage of the term was political more than geographical.
The borders of the region were defined not according to fixed latitudes and longitudes, but according to changing political borders and alliances. Even if the historians were not always directly involved in the events, their lives were effected by the developments in the empire. With the new century, the Ottoman historian now had to cope with the already existing de jure or de facto nation-states while witnessing their consolidation of power at the expense of the Ottoman empire.
Although Greece became independent in , her expansion continued during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to her claims over Macedonia, Crete and the Aegean islands. Modern Greece, thus, is the product of almost a hundred years of confrontation with the Ottoman empire. Bulgaria too expanded at Ottoman expense. Serbia and Montenegro made territorial gains, a united Romania was created and continued its enlargement in the twentieth century. Therefore, although, with the exception of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was invaded and later, in , annexed by Austria-Hungary, all the Balkan states were products of the nineteenth century, their modern shape was the production of the twentieth.
Certain words are commonly used by the late nineteenth-century Ottoman historians to narrate and interpret the events in the European territories of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century. These words continued to be used by the twentieth-century Ottoman historians to describe the same events and, further more, these were carried into the Republican era and used by the historians of the nation-state. The most-used word in the texts to define the Balkan movements, regardless of the events or size of the uprising, is ihtilal. However, the meaning attributed to the term ihtilal might stem from the attitude of a certain historian to a particular event.
He commented that it was strange that although the aim of the French in bringing about a revolution was to acquire independence, liberty, equality and freedom, what they ended up with was an absolutist government of a base people in which the rules were those such as murdering the innocent. Once the Ottoman state was founded on virtues which brought prosperity and victory.
The youth were moved by a great feeling of security and trust, a deep feeling of being followers and of submission. For this reason a government could keep its position for a long time. It was possible to preserve order, to assure social harmony and to manage well the political balances. But today the morality which had become for us a pious tradition, has disappeared.
The young man, confronting the elders, felt in himself the confidence of a grown man. In fact, a chain of events which brought about this result was the events of fate. But it was not possible to contain this result, which was natural and justifiable to a certain degree, at the point which was necessary. Nobody knows their limits, nobody is contented with his rights, everyone wants easily and quickly to be granted the happiness of reaching the highest positions. Revolts are sudden and either they succeed in reaching their limited goals, or not, but they always die down again suddenly.
Therefore the national movement became a movement of both segments of the society which together created the nation. The Turkish National Liberation War was thus defined as a national movement. Fetret was also used. Although some of these words were popularly used by later historians in similar contexts, the late nineteenth-century Ottoman narrative style was generally rejected in favour of a new simple and more direct style, mainly advocated by the young Ottoman intellectuals who sought to create a language which would be understandable by the ordinary people.
Other words used repeatedly in the texts in relation to these uprisings and revolts demonstrate an understanding of the state as a kind of educator, as well as a father figure. Thus, the oppression of such uprisings was called terbiye. Even if these Ottoman subjects were considered as in some way independent of the state, this was considered inappropriate and, further, was not taken seriously.
The use of force is represented using a terminology which reflects the central position of the Ottoman state not only within Ottoman but also Republican history-writing. The Nationalist Movements or Spoilt Behaviour? These uprisings were not planned and consistent campaigns of rebellious people who, driven by a conscious and developing idea of nationhood, aimed at achieving independence from the Ottoman yoke and at establishing their own nation-states.
Within a framework that perceives the people of this region as unable to govern themselves or act independently without outside intervention, it would hardly be possible to conceive of a vision of nationalism as a driving force. Nationalism as a concept was a developing one even in nineteenthcentury European intellectual thought. It is possible to see the reflection of this cognitive development on the Ottoman elite of the period. However, being aware of the development of a new concept in Europe did not result in an understanding of the concept similar to that in Europe.
The Ottoman elite developed its own interpretation of the understanding of nationalism which was quite different from that accepted today. This understanding was very much affected by the empire paradigm valid within the state, the established status of people and groups, and the balance of power politics. According to that elite view, nationalism was not perceived as something which developed naturally within the society.
Rather it was a different method of foreign intervention in Ottoman territory. The words which are later seen as components of nationalism within modern Turkish vocabulary, such as vatan, millet, kavim and cinsiyet were used with different meanings, whose sense depends on context. Attaching fixed meanings to words without regard to the specific context in which they are used and without acknowledging fluctuations of meaning not merely from author to author but from text to text of the same author in the highly dynamic environment of the Ottoman nineteenth century is unlikely to lead to any accurate understanding of the concepts of the time.
They were the states which governed them or states which had interests or contractual relationships such as international treaties that would give them a say in the application of this new rule. In the Ottoman context, the application of this new rule existed because the Great Powers wanted it in order to manipulate and weaken the Ottoman empire.
Moreover, France too favoured this policy due to its ambitions over Belgium. For the late nineteenth-century Ottoman elite what needed consideration was not any amorphous concept such as nationalism but what they saw as the concrete reasons for revolt. Nationalism was not used as a term to define the Balkan uprisings, since it was not considered an appropriate tool to define these events, the nineteenth-century Ottoman historians preferring traditional identifications such as religion and explaining these uprisings as being due to concrete causes such as foreign intervention, corruption, and the inability of the state to display sufficient power.
The history texts from the early twentieth century started to focus on more idea-related explanations for the Balkan uprisings, although nationalism still did not appear as the all encompassing factor behind them. The state, therefore, creates the millet. Among them the Serbs rose several times. For example, it is a mistake to give the name Ottoman nation to all the subjects of the old Ottoman empire, because there were various nations within this mixture.
Due to its vagueness and generality, this definition of Ottoman territory allowed for the possibility of a wide application. The Moreans, who had a connection with the European nations through seamanship, learned, thanks to the church and the school, that they were slaves and that in order to free themselves from this [slavery] it was necessary to revolt. Their schools and churches taught them that they were Greek. The Morean young men who studied in Russia and other places in Europe strove for the liberation of their fellow nationals. The Russians, who wanted first to weaken and then to carve up the Ottoman state, gave a formidable amount of help to them.
They transmitted national aspirations and traditions to the new generations, and in this way they prepared a suitable ground for a movement of national awakening. Ideals of liberty and equality, nationalism and independence, which were thrown out by the French Revolution, came to the ears of the Christian subjects, who lived in the towns and had commercial contacts with Europe.
These were slowly disseminated by them to other Christian reaya. At the time when the Ottoman Muslims had formed no clear idea of the French Revolution, the Greeks of Galata, Fener, Bucharest and the Aegean who had contacts with Europe, on the other hand, had more or less grasped the true nature of the event. The significance of these terms lies more in the change in the self-identification and selfrepresentation of the Ottoman historian than in a change of attitude towards these uprisings which rested largely on the idea of the centrality of the state.
Der Traum des Lugatan (German Edition)
The Centre-Periphery Paradigm The character of the representation of the Balkans by the late Ottoman and early Republican historians was very much related to the general political developments within the state and Europe. As discussed earlier, the Ottoman world view in general and the Ottoman perception of the Balkans in particular was carried from the empire to the nationstate via the texts and the intellectuals themselves.
The pivotal frame of reference, carried from the empire to the nation-state in relation to the representation of the establishment of nation-states in Ottoman lands, was the elite perception of the centre-periphery relationship within the Ottoman context. According to this perception, the elite of the centre perceived itself as a part of central government and its interests overlapped with the interests of the state.
This attitude automatically led the elite to think and write taking the state as the centre of its narratives. This perception, thus, dictated the way the historians represented the establishment of the nation-states in Ottoman European territories and formed the paradigm within which they perceived these developments. The late Ottoman historian in the centre identified himself neither with the sultan nor with the subject.
The historian, now, became not the historian of the sultan or the Ottoman dynasty but the historian of the state of which the sultan was the integral figure-head. This general understanding of the establishment of the Balkan nation-states remained the same in Republican historiography. The periphery could not have an existence or identity independent of the centre. This understanding naturally led to a perception of the supremacy of the centre over the periphery, with the periphery being a dependent, subservient being.
The central government both imposed political power on the provinces, and, through its agents, controlled the local power bases, acted as intermediary in local conflicts and, especially in the nineteenth century, began to spread its influence into traditional communities through education, quarantine, military service, censorship and censuses. While the centre thus redefined its role, there was no consciousness of any need to redefine periphery.
Since the centre did not recognize the possibility of change in the role of the periphery, it considered any challenge to its power coming from the periphery as a challenge not from the periphery itself but from other outside centres of power. For Montenegro, for example, Russia was perceived as a centre while Montenegro itself was denied any independent significance. In the text there is a clear shift of centre from the Ottoman empire to Russia which was able to control the periphery, that is Montenegro.
Mehmed Salahi, who was sent to the island as a government inspector to investigate the disorder there, locates Greece in the central role, attributing to it the role of what one might call a pirate centre. Not only physical aid, such as weapons or soldiers, or schools and hospitals, but also the influence of ideas from outside on Ottoman subjects was considered a threat to the Ottoman state.
In particular, the banning of books and newspapers and the strict entry controls imposed on books produced outside Ottoman territories, or even those from within the autonomous provinces, make clear the understanding of threat for the Ottoman state. The physical presence of outside powers was something which the Ottomans of the later nineteenth century were forced more and more to come to terms with.
And the consul will find things to do. While for the Ottoman government, which sought to decrease the influence of the foreign powers in its periphery while trying not to upset any Great Powers, such foreign presence was unattractive, for the periphery it was the reverse. The dealings of the Ottoman representatives in the periphery with the consuls of the Great Powers were careful and the demands and the interests of the local people were important reference points that were used against Great Power interests.
The Muslims of Crete, too, were loosing their faith in the empire. The concerns of Ottoman subjects were not limited to issues of security or survival, but also involved everyday matters such as taxation and ways of avoiding payment. In their writings, the local people could be oppressed and deceived by bandits and in turn become bandits opposing the authority of the state.
Because the aforementioned Vlachs and the Albanians, made up of 20, families, cannot go as shepherds together with their flocks of sheep to Thessaly, and because they have no possibility of following another profession which will induce them to give up shepherding, they may oppose the handing over of Thessaly to Greece. In fact, they will unite and come together and if they are not successful, they will turn to banditry.
Whatever happens, neither the Muslim nor the Christian Albanians can in any way rejoice at the destruction of the Vlachs, because they will think that the harm which befell the Vlachs will in the future also happen to them. For this reason, it can be inferred that they, taking up arms together with the Vlachs, will oppose the handing over of Thessaly to Greece. Just after the Bulgarian declaration of the annexation of Eastern Rumeli in , the Serbian government declared war against Bulgaria, thus creating an opportunity for the Ottoman government to restore its power there.
The Ottoman government declared that the Bulgarian Principality was under the sovereignity of the Ottoman empire and therefore the Serbian declaration of war would be read as an attack against the Ottoman empire. The Ottoman government did not, however, extend any material support to the Bulgarian army and guaranteed not to intervene militarily over the issue, preferring to search for a diplomatic solution to restore the status quo in Eastern Rumeli. Here there is a strange issue: Because the Bulgarians were our subjects and an attack against them from outside meant an offence against Ottoman rights.
This is a true thing; but was it not our rightful and legitimate duty to reprimand a presumptous entity which directly attacked our rights and cleansed our trampled soil from its dark body? A note had been given to this effect to the Serbian government, too! Having made no sound about the Bulgarians who were invading one of our large provinces, we then proceeded to declare war on those who had said something. Just as if we were preventing the independence of Bulgaria with this kind of action.
The Bulgarians did not fail to express their thanks in practice for this unimaginable generosity: The Greek case was, therefore, the first example of Ottoman loss of territory to the creation of a nationstate. In fact, Greece, unlike the Serbian, Bulgarian or Romanian experiences, was the first nation-state in the nineteenth-century Ottoman landscape which gained its independence de jure within the Ottoman empire without having a long experience of autonomy. Hence the Greek case, for the Ottoman historian, was not something that could be perceived as part of the universal idea that was European nationalism, and Ottoman histories, unlike modern literature on Greek independence, did not represent it as a case of nationalism.
The establishment of the Philiki Etairia, the first uprising of and the process unfolding towards the establishment of a nation-state - the Morean uprising, Great Power intervention which culminated in the burning of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets at Navarino and the declaration of Greek independence - were all considered within this centre-periphery paradigm. This Ottoman representation of the Greek Independence War and the establishment of the Greek nation-state stayed essentially the same throughout the period from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.
There are three main themes which can be detected in Ottoman history-writing on the Greek case: This uprising gave a further opportunity to Russia to prey on a weakened Ottoman state which found itself in a difficult position, and to declare war with the aim of obtaining concessions for Greece, the Principalities and Serbia.
But, can we argue that they brought a different representation of the establishment of the Greek state? The reading of these and similar texts from the same period shows that it is difficult to give an affirmative answer to this question. Therefore, as the bribes increased, the burden on the reaya who were under the control of the local power holders increased. This created an enormous resentment and paved the way for uprisings, one of which was the Greek uprising.
Although Tepedelenli, a representative of local notables in the periphery, i. Because they were excessively disobedient and spoilt, its people, on finding the opportunity revolted from time to time, but they could be taught a lesson by sending soldiers. The state response was therefore justified and Tepedelenli deserved his fate. The second approach questioned the crushing of Tepedelenli, and argued that he was the only counter-power to the Greek rebels who would not have dared to revolt if he had kept his power base.
There was, however, no question of apportioning blame to the sultan Mahmud II, since the person of the sultan was perceived as untouchable, and blame was instead laid at the door of Halet Efendi. The Ottoman historians offer various explanations for foreign intervention in the Greek case.
This explanation is based on the evaluation of the interests and interference of the European states in the Greek case as part of the Eastern Question and part of the general inter-state rivalry of the European powers in the East. Historians adopting this interpretation of the Greek case used the balance of power discussion to explain British and French intervention in the Morean uprising to counter Russian influence in the region. Uprisings in the European territory of the Ottoman empire were not nationalist movements but simply the revolts of a periphery against the centre, motivated not by nationalism but due to outside provocation, a naturally rebellious character, or simply the bad behaviour of an over-pampered people.
But there was something that unsettled the people of the peninsula even more than the approaching army: Before the Turks even set foot on the peninsula, they baptized it and its people with this name, and this name stuck to them, like new scales on the body of an aged reptile. They twisted in their sleep as if they were trying to shake off this name, but the result was the opposite - the name clung to them all the more forcefully, as if it wanted to become one with their skin. They now realized that, divided as they had always been, they had never given their peninsula a name.
Now it was too late to do anything, and so, without a common name, but with a name bestowed upon them by the enemy, they marched to battle and defeat.
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The Balkans as a region and the Balkan people did not appear as a totality in these late nineteenth-century texts. Ottoman definition of the peoples in the European territories of the empire was not based on nation-states or a well-demarcated region. The main identifier for the Ottoman elite was religion: However, there was neither a clear juxtaposition of Christian reaya versus Muslim reaya nor an equality among Christians, nor even among Orthodox Christians. Just as the territorial borders could fluctuate, so could religious boundaries, due to variables other than religious ones, such as material benefit, customs, or simply the need to survive.
This fluidity of borders was not merely something which existed in practice among the people but was recognized by the nineteenth-century Ottoman historians themselves. These historians approached this fluidity of boundaries among religious groups judgmentally. However, this judgmental approach does not necessarily imply a negative or positive attitude. The criterion, which the authors used in order to decide what was good or bad, was statecentric and based on the need for the maintenance of effective state control in the periphery.
Such judgments were thus not based on any religious criteria but purely on benefit to the central state. This is clear from the stereotypic and repetitive attributions made to different groups of people in the Ottoman European territories. According to Mehmed Salahi, the concessions given to the Cretans, regardless of their religion, were premature since they were not sufficiently advanced to handle them.
He represented Montenegrins as primitive in every aspect of life. Their houses were mere huts built of stone and dry tree branches with no modern furniture, such as sofas or armchairs. All existing signs of modernity in Montenegro, such as new weapons and a hospital, were provided by the Russian government. Ahmed Rasim too perceived this Montenegrin practice as barbarity: They cut off their noses and ears and shooed the prisoners away. This seems to have appeared in the period of the Balkan Wars. At the head of the Serbian rebels there was a pig herder called Kara Yorgi, who had learned a little soldiering as an insignificant officer in Austria.
The band gathered around him consisted only of pig herders who drove pigs in the mountains and forests, and who, because of their work, were always armed and accustomed to having no constraints, and highway robbers and village raiders who were shown and applauded in Serbian songs as if they were national heroes. Although, with the Berlin Treaty , the Ottoman empire lost her suzerainty over Serbia, the Danubian Principalities and Montenegro, and was forced to accept the autonomy of Bulgaria, this crucial change in the map of the region did not find an immediate reflection in the Ottoman historiography of the area.
The history texts which appeared after the Congress of Berlin followed the mind set of the pre-Congress period, despite the fact that the authors of these texts were well aware of the new shape of the region and what repercussions this new order might bring. The Ottoman government was highly aware of the centrality of European politics for the survival of the empire.
Alarmed, the Ottoman government asked its embassies in Europe to investigate whether this news was true or not. Moreover, the private talk between the Prince and the King also attracted the attention of the Ottoman government and increased concerns over the possibility of an alliance, at least between Greece and Bulgaria. Any doubt the Ottoman government might have had over a possible alliance was erased by the assurance given by various Great Power representatives that the political incompatibilities of the Balkan entities made any such alliance impossible.
This further strengthened Ottoman lack of any conception of a Balkan identity because no such indigenous structure was perceived and if any such structure were to emerge it would only be as a result of European intervention or support. The Ottoman empire was, for the Prince, the only state that could stand against Russian ambitions in the East.
This proposal was repeated in a more cautious manner by the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs. After presenting the proposals, the Ottoman ambassador in Belgrade expressed his doubts that either the King or the Minister would have had the courage to propose this kind of an alliance against Russia without the knowledge and permission of Austria, who had considerable concerns over Russian influence in the region in which it, Austria, had a great interest.
For the ambassador, therefore, this was in effect an Austrian plan against Russia which did not involve putting Austria herself at risk. This denial of any existence other than as a periphery for the Balkan region might also explain why any statement by the representatives of the Great Powers carried more weight than those of even the kings of the Balkan nation-states on issues directly related to the region, for such states could only function in relation to a centre be it Ottoman or one of the Great Powers.
This idea that the Balkan entities needed centre s to exist blocked any conception of the region as an independent unit and its people as a whole even in the later Ottoman and early Republican era. Apart from being denied an existence as a single entity, the Balkan states, rather in the way the peoples too were denigrated or belittled, were seen as being small states. The time always comes when the hand of the protector turns to torture.
We were driven even out by our former shepherds and servants. We must not remove from our hearts until the Day of Judgment the pain of this insulting blow which we have received. The Great Powers, who all had their own, divergent interests in the region, were not likely to look with favour on the creation of a Balkan Union.
Greece too was guilty of expelling Bulgarians from its soil. Since the Balkan Pact was based on such injustice, it was, in the opinion of Ormanjiyev, doomed to failure. The term did not mean Balkan peoples, a people united by a common social and cultural bond. Whatever social and political face the Balkan nations present, it is necessary not to forget that they have common ancestors from the same blood and from related tribes who came from Central Asia.
The mass of people who for thousands of years came one after another along the northern and the southern routes of the Black Sea like waves of the sea and who settled in the Balkans, even though they carried different names, are in reality nothing other than [people] from sibling tribes who emerged from the same, single cradle with the same blood circulating in their veins.
Any Turkish desire to create common reference points was viewed in the Balkans with irritation, suspicion, or ridicule. The region was one of violence and barbarism, it was associated with migration and the spread of dangerous ideas, as well as sometimes offering a more positive example of the way forward to the historians both of the late Ottoman era and of the new Republic. It carried for both the Ottomans and the Turks a strong feeling of a fatherland in which the Danube played a significant role. Its image was also very closely bound up with two outside powers, Europe and Russia. Further, although the images were constant, the recipients were not.
On occassion, government policy determined what image was applied to which state. Turkey had problems over the territorial claims of both Greece and Bulgaria, expressed in their state anthems. Relations with Bulgaria, were, however, not good. Necmettin Deliorman, to ensure publications favorable to Turkey. Turkey, Where are You Going? If it is important to you to know what an Oriental is going to do you must ask yourself three questions: When you have answered these questions you will know three things that the Oriental certainly will not do.
Nearer to his intention than that you cannot get. Such responses could also be published in book form. He established a direct link between civilization and progress, to which humans were naturally inclined. For him, civilization was equal to technology, science and modern methods in business, none of which were restricted to Europe, while European lifestyle and culture did not form part of his understanding of civilization.
For him, thus, there was no need to adopt European culture and lifestyle in order to be civilized: Now if we want to adopt civilization, wherever we find true public works of this kind, we shall take them.
Just as we do not need to adopt the eating of leech kebap from the Chinese in order to be civilized, we are not under any obligation [to accept] European dancing or imitate their marriage practices. This was a response in part to the European charge of barbarity and irrationality. It was, however, Islam which had brought back Greek civilization, Europe thus receiving Greek civilization which the Europeans claimed as the root of the European civilization, from Islamic civilization. The followers of this view also attempted to demonstrate that the Ottomans were a part of European civilization and that the European accusation of Ottoman barbarity was groundless.
Instead of demented and childish behaviour giving way to feelings which, like love and desire, are temporary, forgettable, and leave behind them frustration, separation, and regret, and leaving to one side all that daydreaming, I changed my plan of action, thinking that it would be necessary to prove to an English girl and an English family that Turkishness within a society is not an example of barbarity, but an adornment, and that the Turks too are a civilized nation.
As in the pre era, in this new era, too, the Ottoman elite was very receptive to European views on the Ottoman empire. Mehmed Bey complained to Ramsay about The Times newspaper because of its biased coverage of the Ottoman empire and contemporary developments within the empire.
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They did not destroy the works of the Romans, Byzantines and Seljuks which they found in the areas where they set up their governments. On the contrary they benefited from them. The second reason for this scarcity of the signs of civilization was that the Ottomans were constantly forced to fight against their enemies making it impossible to concentrate on works of civilization: Yes, we were a military government, we spent our lives in war. But if Ottoman history is studied well, it will be seen that the wars we ourselves initiated were few, indeed very few.
Our enemies always come against us, we are then forced to come against them. These problems apart, however, the authors stressed the inherent civilization of the Ottomans: One of the responses among the Ottoman elite was acceptance of the great danger in which the Ottoman empire found itself and, consequently, of the need to imitate European models in order to survive. The journal, thus, was addressed to a wider readership with its wide range of writers from both within Ottoman domains and from outside.
If we unite, let us be sure that no one can bend our arm. A history text from clearly shows Turkish resentment over the lack of European concern for the aggression of the Balkan states against the Muslim population during the Balkan War: Here the author contrasts European attitudes to barbarity, acceptable against Muslims, but not Christians: Nothing is left unwritten, nothing is left unsaid when a bandit who attacks our soldiers on the Bulgarian or Greek frontier is disposed off.
But when they burn our villages and cut off the ears and noses of our wretched Muslim brothers, we remain silent. When we are about to send soldiers against our own ignorant subjects who are revolting only due to provocation, the big! English newspaper [The] Times seeks to say that we cannot do anything against the Christians, the Catholic Albanians, who have revolted, because of the Austrian right of protection over the Catholics. So this is how European civilization behaves!
In his poem, chosen to form the Turkish national anthem, the first two verses of which were then put to music, one of the verses which technically forms part of the national anthem but is not sung, depicts civilization, here meaning European, as a single-toothed monster.
This confrontation with Europe was inevitably carried on into statesponsored national history-writing. History-writing was perceived as a means of demonstrating the Turkish contributions not only to the eastern but also to the western civilizations. We are fearful of going down in history as a people, a nation who will be remembered with hatred by future generations. Whereas in fact we are determined to be the possessors of the most august and honourable place in history as an entity which individually and nationally produced the highest works for civilization, which worked hard for the progress of humanity, which left valuable, perpetual works of knowledge and art which will be beneficial for generations to come.
For this reason we will raise our children with this thought, this upbringing and this conviction. In , Edward Freeman44 ended his book on Ottoman power in Europe with a description of the Ottoman place there. The Turk succeeded in orientalizing and proselytizing and reducing to practical servitude a considerable part of the Balkans because he found there no unity of race or religion, but he has never succeeded in assimilating the conquered people here or elsewhere. Wherever he rules we find squalor and decay, and the suggestion of the distracting temporary settlement of a migratory race.
After discussing the hospitality of the Turks, Francis Beaufort, sent to Anatolia to make a survey by the Lords Commissioners of the Admirality in , moves on to the Greeks: In this point of view, the character of the modern Greeks would ill bear a comparison with that of their oppressors; such a comparison, however, would be unfair, for slavery necessarily entails a peculiar train of vices; but it may be hoped, that the growing energy, which one day will free them from political slavery, will also emancipate them from its moral effects.
Past and Present written by W. Williams, the former editor of The Sunday Strand, the Armenian inclination to intrigue was credited to the Turkish oppression: In a history text book, Samih Nafiz Tansu reverses the European claims of Ottoman corruption of virtues of its subjects by attributing the responsibility for the deterioration of the Ottoman governance in the Balkans to the people of these conquered lands: The Ottoman administration, which had been the symbol of law and justice in the fifteenth, sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, became corrupted under the affects of the corrupted morals of the people of the countries which it had occupied, bribery, corruption, and patronage became very widespread and the leaders began to oppress the people.
Mehmet Ali Ayni, who was at that time government inspector, related his conversation with a group of young Muslim Albanians in Yanya Ioannina in These Albanians wanted to dis-identify themselves from the Ottoman element and to prove that, unlike the Ottomans who were destined to be expelled from Europe, Albanian Muslims were the autochthon people of the Albanian lands and therefore, unlike the Ottomans, had the right to live there: Therefore we want to stay in our homeland.
This creation of a rooting in the soil as a response to the European threat of expulsion was similarly used by the Turkish national historians for their claims over the Anatolian lands, expressed in the first state-sponsored Turkish History Congress. But the amunition which falls from the rifles and cannons plants the seeds of humanity and civilization in the places where it falls. This is in essence an exalted obligation, but a bitter one in the face of Albanian ignorance, and will be the final obligation in the pages of the fate of Albania.
In the third volume of the history text Tarih, prepared for high schools as a part of the nationalistic project of re-writing history according to the needs of the Turkish nation-state, the European support for the Greeks was explained as follows: Classical Greek language and literature had been taught for a long time in middle and high schools in European countries such as England, France and Germany.
The life of Ancient Greece, dressed up and embellished, was presented as more brilliant and more civilized than it actually was. Ancient Greek philosophers, poets, orators and historians were read and expounded and the exaggerated stories of the Ancient Greek wars were thought of as if true. In short, most of the literate westerners were lovers of and respectful of Ancient Greece. Even the great English poet Byron, after various unseemly events which made it impossible for him to stay in his own country, went to Greece to save the Greeks, and joined the rebels.
The famous French poet Victor Hugo wrote a collection of poems praising and eulogizing the Greeks and calumniating the Turks. Some worthless English and French officers even attached themselves to the rebels. In short, throughout Europe various social classes were captivated by philhellenism. This current of thought had its effect on European men of state. These bloody events left no trace other than a few pages in the history books written only by the Ottomans.
This perception justified for European politicians their incitement of the Greek attack and subsequent atrocities against the Turkish population. This became a target in the Ottoman and Republican response. But their barbarity of thought could not break even to the slighest degree the civilized propensity of the Ottomans. Every individual acted according to his own character. Let me endeavour very briefly to sketch, in the rudest outline, what the Turkish race was and what it is. It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race.
Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked track behind them; and, as far as their dominion reached, civilisation disappeared from view.
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They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by law. For the guide of this life they had a relentless fatalism: Similar support continued after the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality on a political level. According to this list, 12 of the 78 Committee members were MPs, whose posts were underlined and translated into Ottoman. In neither version was there a separate appendix on the Bulgarian massacres, demonstrating that the issue became more important within Britain than in France and that the author tailored his narration accordingly.
Ahmed Rasim summarized the echo of the Bulgarian uprising in Europe: It is thought that the enmity of the Englishman Gladstone began at this time. The author, Osman Nuri Peremeci sought to demonstrate the Turkish contribution to civilization. He claimed Arab men of learning as Turks, underlined the existence of a pre-Islamic Turkish literature and set out to explain why the Turks, after accepting Islam, gave up their script and chose Arabic letters and why they chose to write in Arabic and Persian in attempt to prove that this was not due to any Turkish lack of civilization.
An Answer to the Bulgarian Ambassador G. Halil Yaver claimed that in Bulgaria, insulting Turkey had become a tradition. This nation, with its crude, unworked, and unrefined soul, without fine arts, with no power of creativity, with hatred of the Turk as the only national culture, raised constantly memorizing poems which explained how the eyes of an Anatolian Turkish soldier crucified on Mahya hill were gouged out, how his nails were pulled out, how his fingers were broken, how his penis was cut off, raised giving constantly fallacious and wrong lessons of this enmity towards the Turks to Bulgarian children in all the books of culture such as reading, history and geography in the schools, never able to add a single brick, a single tile to the great civilized work of humanity in the Balkans, this nation remained as something Medieval in modern civilization, only burning, destructive, tyrannical, narrow minded, of limited mentality, dull of soul, senseless.
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However, the place of the two cases in the civilization discourse demonstrated that the representation of the establishment of the Balkan nation states became a part of the Ottoman and Republican confrontation with Europe. Every European perception of the Ottoman empire found a reaction among the Ottoman elite, in particular among the Ottoman historians. In these cases there was no break in presentation between the empire and the Republic, the historiography of the Republic functioning as if it was the direct inheritor of that of the empire.
The Ottoman-Russian confrontation was, from the eighteenth century onwards, one of the most important topics on which the Ottoman and Turkish historians had inevitably to focus. Direct or indirect Russian involvement in the uprisings and separatist movements which developed in the Ottoman territories in Europe made Russia one of the main actors on the Balkan scene in Ottoman and Republican history-writing. Russia was defined as the number one enemy of the Ottoman empire in Republican historiography. According to this distinction, Russia was not considered a part of European civilization, and Russian Panslavists contended that European civilization was not desirable for the Russian world.
In a school text of , Russia was treated not as an intrinsic part of, but rather as a late comer to, European civilization. This led, as has been pointed out by Osman Nuri Ergin, to a lack of homogenity and variety of styles throughout the volumes. Although the Republican historians were not united over the place of Russia in European civilization, they were agreed on the importance of Russian involvement in the Balkans. Panslavism became the image of Russian infiltration into Ottoman European lands through ideas. The society founded in Moscow and its branches elsewhere, following their ideas and desire to bring about the establishment of Slav unity, left nothing undone by word or deed in the regions of Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro in pursuit of the dreams of establishing a great Southern Slav state on the ruins of Austria and the Ottoman empire whose established governments they strove to topple and obliterate.
With that aim, the hearts and minds of the Slavs dependent on Austria were also aroused. These nations living under the Turkish yoke remembered that they had their own past, their own state in the past. Upon finding an opportunity, and with Russian provocation, they revolted. After the conclusion of the Paris Treaty, the officials of the Slav Union Society, which was established in Russia in with the aim of stirring up the Slavs in the Balkans into revolt against Turkey, provoked the Bosnian and Herzegovinan Christians and gave a great deal of money for works such as the building of churches and schools.
The same propaganda was made among the Bulgarians. Such use of violence narration was not in itself new and indeed was very much present, for example, in fifteenth-century Latin calls for a crusade against the Turkish menace, perceived as threatening the very survival of the Christian world. Targets of such narration, aimed at canalizing feelings of revenge, varied according to the enemy of the moment.
He was writing at a period when the discussions over the sovereignty of Crete had reached peak-point. The hot issue now was Crete, not Bulgaria. The Balkan Wars represented a huge psychological blow for the Ottoman elite. The Ottoman despair, the level of violence associated with these wars and the acute sense of alienation from the Balkans are all expressed in a poem written in that period by Mehmed Akif Ersoy , himself an Albanian: One of the ways in which they sought to do this was to stress the violence and, together with this, to underline violence within a religious context.
The atrocities perpetrated by the Greeks, since they landed in Smyrna exceed all similar crimes recorded up to now in the annals of history. The Greek soldiery have even violated little girls under eight and old women above seventy years of age. Great is the number of villages which have been burnt down by them, without any military necessity.
All the sacred institutions and objects of worship which all nations, not excepting the most savages [sic. The Koran, the sacred book of Mohammedans, has been torn to pieces and its leaves used for the filthiest and most disgusting purposes before the very eyes of Turkish peasants. Woman was always a very important and powerful metaphor for the honour of the community defined in a sexual sense.
Infiltration of the female space was in fact infiltration of the sacred space of the community, defined by its male members. The sexual accesibility of a woman for her husband alone was the main factor in the honour of the community within its religious and traditional system.
In his account of the destruction of Manisa, he discusses the impact of rape on the community: When it comes to this subject, all the townspeople and villagers remain silent. This disaster of honour is not like a bayonet wound for the women and girls who remain alive. It remains a stain on the lives of those who were virgins, of the widows, and of the married women.
We spoke on the road with a 13 or 14 year old village boy. That is why women and girls try not to talk about their suffering but to strive to have it forgotten. In narration by implication, the author left much to the imagination of the reader. Ahmed Rasim, in his account of the fleeing of the Muslims in Crete into the Ottoman castles, refers to four Muslim girls being seized and taken to the mountains by bandits: The fate of the three other girls is left unexplained as is the condition of the girl who was rescued.
This narration was much more personal in approach giving often the names of the individual assaulted and the names of their villages and towns: Then cutting of their ears and their fingers one by one, they killed the two women in front of their husbands. Her husband described her tragic death: In this poem, sexual offence was not only penetration but also forcing the girls to dance in front of the soldiers: Such violence was familiar to an Ottoman audience who had either witnessed the effects of such violence or had read about it in newspapers or other publications about the atrocities perpetrated on the Muslim population of the Balkans during and just after the Balkan Wars.
These books gave very vivid descriptions of violence and torture - extending from ripping fezes from the heads of Muslims to plundering, forced conversion and rape. One picture was of the public exhibition of a Muslim man in Kavala whose eyes had been gauged out and whose lips and nose cut off. Balkaneski represents the Balkans, the symbol of blind imitation of the West, of western materialism and clinical rationalism and of imitation of a European life style in which it had no place. Believing that the Balkan armies would bring democracy and civilization to Serez Siroz - which did not in fact offer much resistance to the Bulgarian forces - the father decided to stay rather than join the retreating Ottoman army, and was subsequently killed by Balkaneski.
During her struggle with him, she thinks: What should she do? What should she do now? The disgusting spittle of this enemy who held nothing sacred was smeared over every part of her body. Her honour was being stripped away by force. Her cries went unanswered, no help could reach her. No, no, no… Lale decided to commit suicide rather than accept penetration by the enemy. This story also carries an admonition for the Turks: In a more general sense, violence, as in torture and brutality, was in itself essential to these narrations.
The impact of such descriptions of violence was enormous in particular when it involved children. They impaled up to little ones, only six months old, or one or two years old, on objects such as long bayonets, knives, stakes… As their tiny bodies were in the throes of death, while trembling, their blood flowed, these hordes of barbarians held them up in the air, jigging around, dancing, and these little ones died under a sky stained blood red.
Cursed [Greek soldiers] incinerated our beautiful villages on the shores of the Marmara. They plucked out the eyes of the innocent villagers not sparing the women, the girls or even the babes in swaddling clothes, they cut off their ears, their noses, their breasts, they ripped open their stomaches, and all that in the world can be called barbarous they did. In a school history text book published in for the fifth year of primary school, the authors use similar simplistic descriptions of violence, regardless of the period discussed. Victimization and innocence of individuals was now much more prominent than in the nineteenth-century accounts in which injustice is seen as being against the state rather than against the innocent individual.
Another major theme in violence narration was the assault on the Muslim holy places. The existence of such holy places signified the right of Muslim existence on this Muslim soil. Fear and terror of infidel contamination of places held sacred by the community is a universal theme. In the fifteenth century, the fall of Constantinople was seen by many Latin contemporaries in terms of horror at the Muslim dominance of Christian holy places. The Republican government watched the assaults on the Muslim holy places carefully. A letter dated September from the Turkish embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing Ankara of the assault on a shrine in Deliorman in Bulgaria by a group of Bulgarian youths, interpreted the event as a demonstration of the Bulgarian feeling of alienation from the newly conquered territory: Bulgarians, who still feel themselves foreigners after 50 years of Bulgarian rule in the region of Deliorman, are trying to take revenge by destroying any traces left of Turkish sovereignty and of the Turkish majority.
Such ideas could be perceived both as dangerous and seditious, and as a source of inspiration for nationalist policies for some of the Ottoman and Republican elite. He also points to the failure of the Ottoman state to control these publications: The real threat from the Balkans, however, stemmed from newspapers published in Turkish by Ottoman and Turkish subjects there.
Certain Turkish and Muslim elements in the Balkans, either from the region or those who had escaped or been exiled to it, were perceived as threats to the reforms undertaken in Turkey because of their publications. According to a document dated 3 December , the embassy contacted the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereupon the Minister himself expressed his regret over this incident and assured the Turkish embassy that all necessary steps to deal with the situation would be taken.
This division within the Turkish minority served the Bulgarian policy of assimilating the Turks by providing education in Bulgarian as an alternative. In this article, while Greece was praised and all Greeks were regarded as victors due to the fact that their election system had functioned successfully, the Kemalist regime was criticized as being autocratic. The end of the Balkan wars ushered in a period of questioning of beliefs, ideas and policies, all of which had failed to prevent the dissolution of the empire, and the enemy was examined in an attempt to find out what had gone wrong with the Ottoman empire.
The traumatic experience of the war paved the way for serious questioning of the idea of Ottomanism. In this story, a young Ottoman officer in Macedonia in felt a burning desire and love for a Bulgarian girl, the daughter of a dead priest. The story ended with his self-examination: For Abdullah Cevdet, the Bulgarians were winning the Balkan War because they had worked odd years, they had strengthened their race, they had been busy with reorganization and carrying out good administration, they had prepared the conditions for victory and independence.
They had faith in the fatherland vatan , liberty and in their country having a future. No villager remained in our villages, no village remained for our villagers. Anatolia has been emptied. Anatolia is ill, Anatolia is dying. They speak Greek as their mother tongue but at home they can only speak with their old mothers and fathers in Vlach or Bulgarian.
Such men can often be met among the heads of the financial and economic institutions, and even among the high officials of state. There are many around them who know their genealogical tree, but no one looks down on them. They see no need to hide their origins. For us every handfull of its soil is a reminder of the body of a hero who was sacrificed for it. For us our land is beyond comparison with the vatan of China or Siberia.
What was the vatan, where were its borders, what made a land a vatan, were all questions the answers to which changed from period to period, from individual to individual. But what was sure was that vatan was not limited to the political borders of the state; it might coincide with them in some cases, but the imagination of the vatan was not circumscribed by them.
What kind of benefit could we receive from these insignificant lands? The Ottoman government entered into negotiations with Bulgaria in to try and persuade the Bulgarian government to declare war on the side of the Axis powers. Many Anatolian and Balkan folk songs mourned the futile deaths of their soldiers in Yemen and questioned the reason for such dying. In a folk song from Erzincan, the woman who sent her husband to Yemen asks: The new state was anxious to give out a message of being contented with the existing state frontier and of their being no Turkish wish for expansion.
On the day on which the national liberation came about we were friends only with the Soviets and all our neighbours kept alive in their minds all the memories of old hatreds.
The Republic perceived one of the fundamental conditions for a strong civilized way of living as being the existence of an atmosphere of security within the family of nations. It counted the ensuring of good and sincere neighbourly relations with its neighbours which had recently separated from the empire as necessary for the happiness of the nation. It was, however, very much the result not of an ideological conviction about vatan but a pragmatic realization of the realities of political power. This too can be seen in the annexation of Hatay.
But whether this was in reality a reflection of what the elite emotively felt about their vatan is another matter.